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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
MOSES BLANCHARD,
Plaintiff and Appellant
-vs-

DONALD E. SMITH, et al,
Defendants and
Respondents.

APPELLANT'S
BRIEF
No. 7869

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff brought this suit to quiet title to 4 rods
of his deeded premises described in paragraph one of
his complaint. Defendants filed a counterclaim asserting title in them to 19 feet of plaintiff's premises, lying
north of a board fence, which they alleged plaintiff
- -surveyed, built and agreed to in 1905 as a boundary line.
All of this plaintiff denied, and testified that the fence
was built when he came. (tr. 37)
Thus this is a boundary line dispute between plaintiff and defendants. Their titles were deraigned from. a
common source, from the Estate of Halver 0. Tiller,
deceased, who owned both tracts as part of a larger
tract during his lifetime. The decree of Distribution
in said estate, (Ex. H) dated July 5, 1902, distributed
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the south one chain (4 rods) to Edith M. Tiller, who
in turn deeded the same to the plaintiff August 1, 1904,
(Ex. L) and the plaintiff thereby became the owner
of the south 4 rods of the Halver 0. Tille·r premises.
The adjoining 4 rods (1 chain) on the north were distributed to George Tiller, defendants' grantor and predecessor in interest; and the north tract, not involved
herein, was distributed to Helen Tiller ( tr. 7)

Each of said three tracts thus distributed are described by metes and bounds, made by a surveyor, as
the executrix, Mrs. Anna Peery, testified her attorney
W. w. Maughan had it surveyed, at time of said probate proceedings ( tr. 60,66), the respective descriptions
of each tract (as the abstracts show) have always remained the same-a mete and bound description. The
.boundary descriptions clearly show that there is no uncertainty, that the north line of plaintiff's lot coincides
with and is the south line of defendants' lot (see Ex.
J) and that the boundary line between them is an east
and west line, commencing 6.88 chains south of the
northeast corner of lot 1, plat '' B '' Logan City Survey,
and running thence west 2.43 chains. The court found,
''the means of ascertaining the true line has always been
available''.
One important and controlling fact in this case is
the mistake of fact, a mutual mistake of fact, which the
lower court refused to notice, meet, or recognize. It
concerns the one rod strip of ground adjoining on the
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south side of plaintiff's premises, which belonged to
Logan City, but which the plaintiff (and also the Tiller
people) mistakenly believed was his property. If that
one rod had belonged to plaintiff, then he would have
had approximately 4 rods south of said fence, (all but
2% feet). Plaintiff continued in that belief until his
premises were surveyed by the City Engineer, when
the curb and gutter was put in, in 1948 (Ex. M)
(tr. 39-43) The plaintiff testified: "I think that's
what fooled us." ( tr. 45) "I didn't know Logan City
owned it, but thought that Tiller owned it." (tr. 46)
''He (Tiller) figured it was part of his property and I
thought it was too.'' (tr. 47) ''I knew we had 4 rods
apiece. I sat the house down where I thought it was
on my ground." (tr. 48, 79) (Plaintiff built his house
next to said one rod strip which he has used through
the years as a driveway).
The Tiller people likewise labored under said mistake of fact, as we shall later point out.
Other important and controlling facts are: (a)
Plaintiff knew that the fence was not on the boundary
line. (tr. 76)
(b) There is no evidence of any dispute. On this
point the court found: "Neither the defendants nor
any of their predecessors in interest, so far as can be
ascertained, ever knew that there was any thought of
dispute of the property line until the time hereinafter
mentioned.''
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(c) There is no evidence of any uncertainty or indefiniteness.

This counsel sought unsuccessfully to

establish by defendant's grantor, George Tiller, thus:
Q. Did you know whether or not there was an indefinite-

ness existing as to that
any. (tr. 4)

property~

A. Never heard of

(d) There 1s no evidence that the plaintiff had
agreed to accept said fence as the boundary line between
them.
Plaintiff denied that he had done any surveying, or
constructed said fence, and testified that the fence was
there when he came. (tr. 37) Plaintiff alleged and the
evidence shows that he executed to the Fedral Land
Bank a $2,000 mortgage, also a Public Welfare Lien
to the State of Utah. The court, without ordering said
bank or the State be made a party, quieted title in defendants to plaintiff's 19 feet north of said fence, covered by said mortgage in violation of Civil Rules 13(g).
The plaintiff admits that he built his garage, chicken
coop and other buildings up to said fence, due to his
mistaken belief that the one rod strip was his property.
( tr. 79) As soon as he learned the facts, the plaintiff
procured a quit claim deed for said one rod from Logan
City (Ex. P) ( tr. 30-31) and then tried to effect a
settlement with defendants. (tr. 29, 40) When that
failed, he commenced moving the fence over on the true
line, which defendants forbade. (Ex. K) ( tr. 36) Plain-
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tiff then filed this suit to quiet title to his deeded 4 rods.

Plaintiff testified that he knew that said fence was
not on the correct line; that he had about 2% feet on
the north side of said fence. ( tr. 76)
No issue was raised as to the ownership of said one
rod south of plaintiff's property.

That issue was In-

jected by the trial court. (tr. 83) The evidence, by
defendants' own expert witness, Crockett, showed that
Halver 0. Tiller never acquired any interest in said one
rod. And that the same belonged to Logan City. ( tr.
94()) (See also tr. 85). The court nevertheless found:
(1) "That Halver 0. Tiller was the true owner of
said one rod strip, and (2) that Logan City never was
the owner of said south one rod of land.''
There is no allegation or issue and no evidence con·
cerning payment of taxes on said one rod strip, and no
evidence of any ''mixup'' in assessment of property, the
trial court nevertheless found: ''Through a mixup in
connection with the assessment of property, the said one
rod above referred to has never been 'assessed for
taxes.''
It was agreed in open court that plaintiff and defendants had each paid all general and special taxes
on their respective record titles. Plaintiff's 4 rods included the 19. feet in dispute (27.27% of his 4 rod frontage). The abstract and tax record (Ex. A, E, F, N, 0,)
show that plaintiff paid,-on sidewalk assessment., $82.50:
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on sewer assessment $259.12; on curb and gutter assessment, since dispute arose, $137.65; on general taxes
since dispute arose, $167.00. Total: $646.27. .The lower
court refused to require defendants to compensate
plaintiff for any taxes he had paid on said 19 feet,
amounting to about $126.00, but awarded that property
free and clear to defendants' because: "plaintiff has
never paid any general or special taxes upon said one
rod strip.''
There is no evidence or claim of any buildings or
improvements of any kind up,on the 19 feet in dispute.
Defendant Smith testified that he did not check the
description but merely took it for granted that the fence
was on the line. ( tr. 20)
The plaintiff and his two sons positively testified
that for many years they had used the premises north
of said fence for hauling hay, beet pulp, and for their
derrick horse. (tr. 30, 39, 42-3 50, 53) Defendants'
witnesses mainly denied they had seen such use. On
such evidence the court found plaintiff. had never used
the premises north of said fence.

STATEMENT OF POINTS ON WHICH
APPELLANT INTENDS TO RELY ON APPEAL
Point No. 1. The court err~dJ in failing to meet,
find, or recognize the fact, clearly shown by the evidence,
that the plaintiff had been acting under a mistake of
fact (a mutual mistake of fact) in recognizing or assum-
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ing that the alleged fence was near the boundary line,
due to his mistaken belief that the one rod, adjoining
on the south of his premises, was his property.

Point No. 2. The court erred in entering its decree
quieting title in defendants ''of that certain property
north of the fence line," (19 ft. of plain tiff's premises)
for (1) the evidence does not show any uncertainty or
any dispute as to the boundary line, but shows that the
fence was already there when plaintiff came ; fails to
show that the plaintiff had ~fever agreed to accept said
fence as a boundary line, or that defendants had paid
any taxes on the 19ft. in dispute; and (2), the court did
not have jurisdiction to enter its decree quieting title to
said 19 feet without first ordering the State and the Federal Land Bank be made parties to this proceeding, as
required by 13(g) Rules of Civil Procedure.

Point No. 3. Some of the court's findings are outside the issues, without evidence to support them, and
contrary to the evidence: (a) The court's two way finding, ''that Halver 0. Tiller was the true owner of the
one rod strip south of plaintiff's premises"; that
"Halver 0. Tiller in his lifetime considered the one
rod of land at the south end of plaintiff's premises
as part of said Tiller's property." (b) The court's
finding, ''that Logan City was never the owner of the
said one rod strip''; also (c)' the court's finding that,
''through a mixup in the assessment of property the
said one rod has never been assessed for taxes.''
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Point No. 4. Some of the court's findings are con-

trary to the weight of affirmative evidence: (a) The
court's finding that plaintiff had not used the premises
north of the fence for hauling beet pulp, hay, coal, derrick horse, etc.; and (b), the court's finding that the
plaintiff did or caused the survey to be made and that
he built the alleged board fence, on uncertain and
indefinite testimony of George Tiller and Mrs. Peery,
and against the positive testimony of the plaintiff to
the contrary and that the fence was there when he
purchased his premises.
Point No. 5. The court erred in finding and holding
that plaintiff is estopped from asserting title to his
19 feet north of said fence.
Point No. 6. The court erred in justice and equity,
by refusing to assess defendants with a pro-rata share
of the special improvement and other taxes paid by
the plaintiff on said 19 feet, after awarding said premises to defendants.

ARGUMENT
As we think the mistake of fact, stated in Point No.
1, herein, is one of the controlling factors in this case
which excludes it from the rule permitting new boundary
line to be fixed by oral agreement, we want to refer
a little more to the testimony of the parties in order
to show that here was a mistake of fact which controlled
plain tiff's actions through the years, and that the mis-
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take \Yas also
as

m~ttual

Jn£stake of fact-that the Tillers

well as the plaintiff were misled and believed anr]

understood that said one rod strip was part of the
Tiller estate, \vas deeded to the plaintiff by Edith M.
Tiller. Thus :
George Tiller: "I never heard before that the surveyor gave me over 5 rods and Blanchard less than
3 rods. (tr. 11) Edith and I each got 4 rods. I didn't
intend to deed away any of Blanchard's property. ( tr.
14) When the fence was put up, I figured Mose Blanchard got 4 rods south of the fence. The deeds would
call for the right property, I thought (tr. 12) I didn't
figure he was turning any of his property over to
me." (tr. 13)
Mose Blanchard: ''That one rod fooled us all, I
am satisfied about that.''

Q. (by Mrs. Anna Peery)
about this rod 1

When did you find out

A. When they put the curb and gutter down, three
years ago. Never knew about it before. (Ex. C) Yes,
if I had known it, I would have had it done (fence
moved) long, long ago. (tr. 77, 41) "It was the one
rod there that threw us crooked.'' ( tr. 78)
Mrs. Anna Peery: Testified that her father said:
''I'll have to ·buy that little piece of ground so it can
parallel with the street." "I thought that all belonged
to my father's estate. (tr. 65) I intended for Mose to
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have 4 rods as his deed calls for, but I thought it was
measured from the lower fence.

(tr. 68)

It was my

understanding my father bought that from Logan City.
There was, of course, no intention on our part that
Blanchard should have less than 4 rods.

( tr. 70)

RULE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE
Appellant is not contending against the rule of
boundary by acquiescence, long recognized-in this state,
when the location of the true boundary line between adjoining tracts is unkown, uncertain or in dispute, the
owners thereof may by parole agreement irrevocably
establish the true boundary line between them. That
rule has been settled by this Court as the law in this
State. Brown v. Milliner, 232 P 2d 202; Tripp v. Bagley,
276 P. 912, 69 ALR 1417; Rydalch v. Anderson, 107 P
25; Holmes v. Judge, 87 P. 1014.
EXCEPTIONS TO RULE
But there are a number of exceptions or limits
to the above rule which this court and other jurdictions
have recognized as defenses thereto, and which, if the
'facts warrant, will prevent the above rule from being
applied so as to change the boundary line from the true
line by oral agreement or by acquiescence of adjoining
owners in disregard of the Statute of Frauds. · Thus:
(1) Mistake of Fact. _In the case of Brown v. Mil·
liner, supra, this court, speaking through Chief Justice
Wolfe, said :
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"In Holmes v. Judge, supra, we declared that
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 'rests
upon sound public policy, with a view of preventing strife and litigation concerning boundaries' and that 'While the interests of society require that the title to real estate shall not be
transferred from the owner for slight cause, or
otherwise than by law, these same interests demand that there shall be stability in boundaries~.
However, in that case we were careful to mark
off the limits of the rule. Said the court : 'We
do not wish to be understood as holding that the
parties may not claim to the true boundary,
where an assumed or agreed boundary is located
through mistake or inadvertence, or where it is ,
clear that the line as located was not intended
as a boundary, and where a boundary so located
has not been acquiesced in for a. long term of
years by the parties in interest'. (31 Utah 269,
87 P. 1014.)
The law here involved is fully annotated in 69
ALR 1430-1533, following Tripp v~ Bagley, supra. Although there are some cases to .the contrary, the big
majority of the cases there cited under the subhead
"Effect of Mistake" on pages 1485-1489 of said .annotation, hold in harmony with Brown v. Milliner, that
where a party has acted under. a mistake of fact,
especially a mutual mistake of fact, such party is not
estopped, but may claim to the true line upon discovery
of the mistake, just as plaintiff tried to do when
he discovered his mistake. We quote excerpts from a
few cases under said subheading ''Effect of Mistake.'':
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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''In v1ew of the mutual mistake of the parties,
the facts did not raise the issue of an agreed boundary
line." 8 S.W. 549 (Mo.). "In such a case there is a
failure to find the true line through accident or mistake." 80 N.E. 350 (Ill.). "A party will not forfeit
his estate ·by mere mistake nor can the Statute of
Frauds be thus evaded." 70 Am. Dec. 57 (Ohio). "Such
a parole agreement founded in mistake would not be
binding by way of estoppel or otherwise.'' 5 Met. 469
(Mass.). ''When the mistake was discovered, neither
of the parties was estopped from claiming his rights.''
14 S.E. 153 (W.Va).
Even the contra cases cited first under said subhead "Effect of .Mistake", page 1485, which hold the
oral agreement valid notwithstanding the mistake of.
fact, can all be distinguished from the facts in case at
bar.
Thus it is our contention that the rule establishing
boundary line by acquiescene cannot and should not be
applied against plaintiff in case at bar, because his
acquiescenece (if the court holds he acquiesced in said
said fence as a boundary line) has rested on his mistaken belief and understanding all through the years,
until 1948 when his premises were surveyed, that said
south one rod strip was part and parcel of the 4 rods
he purchased from Edith 0. Tiiler in 1904. Soon as
he learned the facts he took action to have fence moved
(tr. 19,50)
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(2) Part·ies knew fence was not on true line.

In

Tripp v. Bagley, supra, this court held that if the parties kne'Y that the fence 'vas not on the true boundary
line, then 'Ye have an exception to the above rule;
that in such case the true boundary line could not be
changed by n1ere acquiescence or change of possession
''even though such change in possession continues
for a long period of time.'' Said the court :
''The question for determination in this case is
wether the facts here bring it within the general
rule or constitute an exception thereto . . . It
thus appears that the partites to this suit knew
that the fence C-D-E did not and could not be
along the true boundary line between the property owned by the plaintiff and that owned by
the defendants ... This court has recognized the
rule that, where coterminous landowners know
the location of the true boundary line, they may
not establish a valid boundary line between their
lands by mere parole agreement at a place other
than the true line ... If adjoining landowners
acquiesce in a division line, with knowledge of
the location of the true line and with the design
and purpose of thereoy transferring a tract of
land from one to the other, such acquiescence
alone will not operate as a conveyance. Land
cannot be conveyed from one person to another
by merely a change in possession, even though
such change in possession continues for a long
period of time. ''
We have already pointed out that plaintiff testified that he knew that said fence did not give him
his 4 rods (even assuming the south one rod belonged
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to him) that he th9ught he had about

2~

feet north

of said fence, hence case at bar comes within the same
exception as this court pointed out and held in Tripp
v. Bradley, to-wit: If one of the adjoining landowners
has knowledge, or understands, that the fence in question is not on the true line, the rule permitting a
boundary line to be fixed by parole agreement or acquiescence does not apply.
(3) NoDispute and No Uncertainty. As we have
seen the plaintiff and defendants and their grantors
in interest all testified, and the court found, that there
had never been any dispute concerning the boundary
line between them. The witnesses all agreed that the
fence had never been discussed. One of· the necessary
prerequisites, a condition precedent, for the above rule
to apply is that the "location of the true boundary
line must be in dispute or uncertain". If there is no
dispute and no indefiniteness, what is there for the
parties to agree upon~ We copy from page 1502 of
the above annotation in 69 A.L.R. thus:
''In Talbot v. Smith (1910) 56 Or. 117, 107 P.
480, 108 P. 125, to defeat the description in a
deed, the plaintiff urged that a fence line or a
stake set up by someone had been acquiesced in
for a long time, and should control. The court
said: 'But there never was any dispute as to
where the line should be; nor was there any cir..
cumstance to call for a settlement of a dispute.
Legal agreements as to disputed ·boundaries are
based upon the fact that the true line is not only
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in dispute, but to some extent undefined and unknown.'
''In Jeffries v. Sheehan (1928) 242 Mich. 167
218 N.W. 703, the court said: 'If the boundary
line of lot 28 was never in dispute and the fenced
in portion of lot 2 was but an encroachment,
then plaintiff's right, if any, to the disputed
strip, rested upon prescription, and not on a
boundary line established by acquiescence.' ''
Defendants, in case at I?ar, cannot succeed in their
suit (counter-claim) in prescription, for they failed to
prove that they had ever paid any taxes on the 19 feet
in question.
Neither did defendants prove .any uncertainty or
indefiniteness. The respective deeds prove just the contrary. Appellant contends that is certain which can
be made certain. That which is certain and definite
will prevail, 11 C.J.S. 538-9. The premises are described
in each deed by metes and bounds. Each tract is tied
to the N.E. corner of Block 1 Plat "B", Logan City
Survey. Both deeds were recorded. The division line
is thus fixed by the descriptions in the deeds, which
defendants seek to defeat in case at bar. As we have
pointed out, George Tiller said he had never heard of
any uncertainty, that he thought, "the deeds would call
for the right property." ( tr. 12)
"In Hartung -y. Witte (1884) 59 Wis. 285, 18
N.W. 174, it was said that that is certain which
can be made certain, and if the true line cannot
be made certain by the deed and a survey, or
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by calls and monuments mentioned in the deed,
then, only, it may be made certain by acquiescence
of the parties.''
In locating courses, the intent of the parties, as
derived from the instrument itself, is to govern. 9
C.J. 167. The burden of proof was upon defendants.
8 Am. Juris. pg 810; 69 ALR 1489.
( 4) No Agreement: A further fatality in defendants' case is their failure to prove any agreement by
the plaintiff to accept the fence as a division line.
As we have seen, neither George Tiller nor Mrs. Peery
testified that they had any such agreement with the
plaintiff. They merely claimed that they saw the surveyor drive the peg and heard him say, "this is the
line" (tr. 9, 61) and that plaintiff made .no objection.
That did not prove any agreement by plaintiff. We
submit that only shows defendants' witnesses were confused, that the survey they saw and testified about was
the one di.rected by Attorney Maughan when he probated the Tiller estate. The court found that "plaintiff's
property was distributed in accordance with the survey
directed by the late W. W. Maughan.'' Why would
plaintiff want a second survevy, 2% years later~ When
the deed he received was certain and specific by mete
and bounds~ Defendants do not explain. There was,
of course, only one survey. Defendants' two main
witnesses also contradict each other, thus:
George Tiller testified that he saw plaintiff build
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that old board fence. l\Irs. Peery testified it wasn't a
board fence, but a hog-,vire fence. (tr. 71) We a·sk:
'vhen 'vas it changed to the present old board fence~
They don't explain. Georg~ Tiller also testified that
plaintiff built the fence first, and then built his house
"about ten feet south of the fence ( tr. 5) ; Mrs. Peery
testified that plaintiff built his house first, and then,
when he 'vas ready to move his family in, he built the
fence. ( tr. 62-3)
Plaintiff testified that he started building his house
1n 1904, after he bought his premises; that he "set
the house on what I thought was my property", which
shows that he then believed that said south rod was
part of his property and that he built his house with
reference to what he thought was his south lines, as he
left only a driveway south of his house, not with reference to any fence on the north side of his house.
We submit that defendants' evidence, that plaintiff
built that fence is so confusing and contradictory that
it falls of its own weight. We quote from Mrs. Peery's
testimony: "Mose Blanchard knows that he built the
fence. My 13 year old brother couldn't build it. We
didn't have the money to build it with." ( tr. 71) "I
lmow he built it because I saw him." "I didn't build
it. My father didn't build it. I say Mose did it or his
boys did. I don't know who did it." ( tr. 72) Mrs.
Peery forgot the age of plaintiff's boys. Fred Blanchard is 47, ( tr. 50), so he was a mere infant in 1905.
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George Blanchard is 40 (tr. 31) so he wasn't born for
several years later. So plaintiff's boys didn't build
that fence.
Again, may we point out where defendants' witnesses defeat their own testimony in their insistence to
claim that plaintiff built that fence. If George Tiller
was then only 13 years old, as Mrs. Peery said, then
that conclusively proves that the survey which George
and Mrs. Peery saw (when the surveyor said, "this is
the line") was the one Attorney Maughan directed to
be made, when he probated the Tiller estate. Mrs. Peery
has already told us that George was 13 years old when
his father died in 1901 (tr. 60) which was of course,
before the estate was distributed, (July 5, 1902) and before plaintiff purchased his premises from Edith M. Tiller (Aug. 1, 1904) ; all of which shows that plaintiff was
not then interested in that property and therefore took
no part in and knew nothing about any survey, just as
he testified. Note also this testimony by Mrs. Peery
which shows the survey line was out in the lot : A. He
(the surveyor) said, ''t~is is the line and it runs straight
back to the river." Q. Was there a fence where the peg
was driven~ A. No. That was in our garden where we
had corn and potatoes. (tr. 61)
For each and all of the foregoing reasons, we respectfully submit and pray that the trial court's judgment be vacated and this Court order title to ·be quieted
in plaintiff as prayed for, and for his costs.
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COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING PLAINTIFE
TO PREPARE ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT
The foregoing brief had all been written and sent
to the printers when defendant's counsel, on July 18,
1952, served a "Demand For Additional Evidence".
On the .same day we filed ''Answer''· to said demand~
stating that "the transcript served June 21st, with
designation of record, contains all matters essential to
decision of questions presented by the appeal to the
Supreme Court". We also asked counsel to "designate
any point or item of testimony ommitted, in order that
the same may be stipulated, or included in supplemental transcript, ''we acted under Rule 75 (e), which provides, ''All matters not essential to the decision of the
questions presented on the appeal shall be ommitted".
Plaintiff is an old
. man, confined to a wheel chair ; he is
on Relief and can ill" afford this additional, and, as we
think, unnecessary expense.
-

-----------

--~--

------

-

--

Defendant's counsel refused to designate any omitted item of testimony, but the next day served ''Designation of Record'' etc., and also ''Affidavit in Support of
Relief for Failure to file Demand'' etc. in time, as required by Rule 75 (a). The court ordered plaintiff to
file transcribed copy of all ommitted testimony, regardless of its materiality; and the court also restrained
the Clerk from filing record of appeal with the Supreme
Court ''until said additional testimony is transcribed.''
The court's order for plaintiff to furnish additional
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testimony, is based on that part of rule 75(b) which

reads: "If the designation does not include all the
evidence, the appellant shall file a copy of such parts
thereof as the respondent may need to enable him to
designate the parts he desires to be added'' etc. (counsel requested the full record in order to enable him to
decide what part he wanted.) Said provision thus is
contrary to the spirit and purpose of Rule 75(e), for
if respondents can arbitrarly demand under Rule 75(b)
that all of the record be transcribed, how can appellant
obtain any relief from unnecessary costs? How can ''all
record be abbreviated under Rule 75(e) ¥ How can "all
matter not essential to the decision be ommitted"Y
1. Appellant submits that the court erred in per. .
mitting respondent's designation of record to be filed
after the time had expired; also that their designation
was too indefinite, and that the affidavit for relief
was insufficient to relieve respondents of their failure
to file designation of additional portions of the record
in time as required by Rule 75{ a).
2. Appellant further submits and prays that Rule
75 (b) be amended by this Court, by deleting that portion thereof above quoted, and substituting therefor the
toll owing: ''If the designation does not include all of
the evidence, respondent Il!ay file a copy of such narts
as he desires to have added, the expense of which shall
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be added as costs to respondent, if he shall recover
costs.''
Respectfully submitted,

LEON FONNESBECK
Attorney for .Appellant
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